Anyone interested in Roman history has probably heard of the battle of Carrhae; it was, after all, one of the greatest defeats the Roman Army ever suffered. It was one of those events that even the Romans themselves thought long and hard about and recognised as a landmark in their history. It effectively marked the end of their expansion in the East, tacitly accepted by Augustus in his later diplomatic dealings with Parthia.
It also marked the end of Crassus, one of the Triumverate with Pompey and Caesar and, reputedly, the richest man in Rome. He has usually taken the blame for the disastrous campaign, and he surely bears some responsibility. But this was a period when powerful men were still able to raise what were effectively private armies for their own glory; and such men always believed themselves invincible. It’s Impossible to judge whether a different general would have fared any better.
The first thing to say is that we have very little hard evidence about the campaign, the battle and its aftermath. The author is very honest about this, but makes excellent use of what we do have.
The Parthians – Rome’s adversary – are an enigma to modern historians, which is a great shame, as they are a tantalising culture. Virtually no Parthian documents have come down to us, for reasons the author describes, so everything has to be examined from the viewpoint of other, mostly later, works, which are often biased. The author is very clear about what are facts, what are logical conclusions and what are suppositions.
The book starts off with an excellent introduction to Roman politics in the time leading up to the campaign, and a refreshing outline of the life and career of Crassus. Much maligned by all since his death, it is shown that he must have been a much more substantial figure than widely believed, and his career, and particularly his relationship with Pompey, is well described.
It also gives as much detail as possible about the rise of the Parthian state.
All this leads to the campaign, and the battle itself. Sampson does not dawdle or over-dramatise. The Romans numbered somewhere over 30,000, and Surena, the Parthian general, knew they could not win a conventional set-piece battle. Instead they used around 10,000 heavy cavalry – called cataphracts – to probe and split the legions. The actual battle was fairly short and losses on both sides were not that great.
But where the Romans really suffered was in the aftermath. Their force had been split, and each section had to decide what to do. They all headed towards Syria, but they were in a hostile environment, poorly led, and the Parthians were everywhere, harrying and raiding the survivors.
It was somewhere on this retreat that Crassus was killed, seemingly accidentally whilst in a truce negotiation forced on him by his own mutinous troops. Ultimately, at least half the army was killed and a quarter captured and sent into slavery. No more than a quarter survived and returned home. The Parthians suffered very few casualties, and captured a number of Roman Eagles, which Augustus eventually recovered over fifty years later by diplomatic means.
The book finally relates the longer term effects on both Parthia and Rome. There were further conflicts between the two, and whilst Rome often won individual battles, she never really managed to move the edge of the empire further east. This has had a significant effect on the history of the area ever since.
Overall, this is excellent history. Balanced, clear about fact and supposition, and thought-provoking. It has very good appendices, and a useful bibliography. If you are interested in Roman history, I would thoroughly recommend it.
This is a review of the Pen & Sword 2008 Kindle edition.
It is an extended version of my review previously published on Amazon and Goodreads.
