Whatever you think of Napoleon Bonaparte and the catastrophic results of his military and domestic policies, he is, without doubt, one of the giants of European history. This book examines the period between the retreat from Moscow to Napoleon’s first abdication. It is, as the author points out, a somewhat neglected area, and he puts that right in this work.
He gives a very good account of the events between 1812 and 1814, and using many personal writings and memoirs, he asks if Napoleon could have come to a negotiated peace with the allies.
The answer from the allied point of view seems to have been ‘yes’. Although they were hardly of one mind on the post-war future, they were all aware of the cost of fighting all the way to Paris. Tsar Alexander was looking for glory, but was temperamental and a poor – but interfering – military commander. Metternich was a highly skilled statesman, looking to ensure Austria – still a French ally at the beginning of the period – came out on the winning side, no matter what.
Prussia was in many ways still the junior partner. She had been devastated by the previous periods of war, but after Napoleon’s failure in Russia, was finally free to switch sides, and brought a significant military contribution to the allied side – not least in the fascinating character of Marshal Blucher. Britain meanwhile was still advancing through Spain, and although she had, as yet, no troops elsewhere in Europe, it was her subsidies which largely kept the other allies going. All were open to the idea of peace.
Napoleon, however, was not. What comes across strongly is that whilst he may have been one of the great military figures of history – although his powers were diminishing by the time of the events discussed in this book – he was simply unable to play the diplomatic game. He would agree to open talks, but his instructions to his representatives were always rigid and unbending, and he interpreted any offer of peace or negotiation as a weakness.
His entourage and colleagues were not much help either. As is often the case with autocrats, he surrounded himself with those who tended to agree with him. Many of his generals had been promoted from obscurity, and whilst they were often excellent divisional or even corps commanders, they generally had little understanding of the wider picture. They were successful as long as they had a Napoleon to direct them.
His civilian ministers and advisers were also a mixed group; some had been around during the ancient regime, the revolutionary period and now the Empire. They were, primarily, survivors. They knew Napoleon would go his own way, and were often playing a double game, as likely to be talking to the enemy as to the emperor himself. During this period, many were in communication with the allied powers, sometimes with Napoleon’s knowledge, often without it.
The result of all this diplomatic activity was that time and time again there were opportunities for him to retain his throne, but he misread every situation, always believing that one more victory would solve everything. He simply refused to listen to anyone offering a different view.
He could not contemplate what he saw as the loss of face involved in accepting any negotiated settlement. In the end, he saw the situation as all or nothing. And so it ultimately proved.
This book is a valuable addition to the studies of the period. I have read two or three biographies of Napoleon, but I got a clearer impression of his character – certainly in this later period – from this book than from any of them.
I’ve also read quite a few other more general works about the period, but until reading this book, I hadn’t really realised how neglected this period is. But it is crucial to our understanding of the events which followed; the escape from Elba, Waterloo, and the reshaping of Europe afterwards. Had Napoleon been able to compromise, he may well have retained his throne, and the course of European history could have been very different. But it just wasn’t in his nature to do so.
This is a review of the Oxford University Press 2014 Kindle edition.
It is an extended version of my review previously published on Amazon and Goodreads.
